The global media is discussing today whether there was a coup d’état in China and whether Xi Jinping has gained or lost power by removing the entire military leadership at once. How could a childhood best friend, whose father fought alongside the Chinese leader’s father, commit such a betrayal? We sought answers to these questions alongside leading Chinese studies scholars Kirill Kotkov and Andrey Devyatov, as well as political scientist Yuri Lyubomirsky.
The arrest of Zhang Youxia, First Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and a CPC Politburo member, who is reportedly the personal friend and second most influential figure in China’s military hierarchy after Xi Jinping, predictably stirred significant reaction. In the West, this was interpreted as the fallout from a foiled coup attempt aimed at arresting Xi himself. Both men were accused of corruption and actions detrimental to state interests. Some are already comparing this case to the arrest of Beria in 1953 or Marshal Tukhachevsky in 1937.
Moreover, crucially, this detention follows a large-scale purge within the general staff that has been ongoing for several years. After the 2025 arrest of another Xi deputy in the CMC, He Weidong, it was Zhang Youxia who concentrated immense influence over the military in his hands.
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Within any ruling structure, various factions exist that don’t always get along. This suggests that some form of behind-the-scenes struggle is indeed taking place, noted Kirill Kotkov, a Chinese studies expert and head of the St. Petersburg Center for Far East Studies, in conversation with Tsargrad:
One doesn’t need to look far for examples—consider South Korea. Name me South Korean presidents who, after leaving office, have not been accused of corruption or faced investigation? There are very few. Such processes occur in all countries. As for China, the arrests began last autumn. Nine individuals were detained then. Now, two more have been arrested. It’s clear these are parts of the same process. China has drawn conclusions by observing Russian experience—specifically, the situation in the Ministry of Defense and cases involving high-ranking generals. They are now conducting “preventive” measures.
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No one can give a clear answer right now as to how much this is connected to internal struggle and competition between various influence groups; this topic is closed off to outsiders, the expert added:
Only one thing is clear: power is being consolidated—including personal power—and the positions of the interests it represents are being strengthened, in preparation for a serious confrontation with the United States and its allies. Whether this confrontation involves Taiwan, we cannot yet affirm. But the fact that Taiwan is the closest potential flashpoint for China is beyond doubt. If a military conflict between the US and China does occur, it will most likely ignite over Taiwan.
Xi Jinping’s Objective
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the key pillar of power in the PRC. And power in China belongs to the CPC. Therefore, the Party is in charge: the state does not control the army; rather, the Party commands both the army and the state, explained Andrey Devyatov, Secretary of the Union of Military Sinologists of Russia, to “Pervy Russky”:
Official statements and media frequently mention the CPC Central Military Commission (CMC). Formally, these are the same body, just with two names. But what is critically important is its essence: it is the military organization of the Communist Party of China. Consequently, the Chairman of the CMC is effectively the paramount leader of China; in a political sense, he can be called the “Emperor.” This is the primary position in the country—more so than the General Secretary of the Central Committee or other individuals holding state posts.
Screenshot of a post from Tsargrad’s Telegram channel
It is the CMC Chairman who truly governs the country, steering it toward the goals of the so-called Chinese Dream, articulated as creating a “community of a shared future for mankind.” This goal is complex and monumental, so it is assumed that an individual holds this post for an extended period, virtually for life, Devyatov added:
All talk about an “unprecedented third term,” or the possibility of a fourth or even fifth term, is secondary. Indeed, a fourth term starting in March 2028 is practically guaranteed. Everything is being done to leave no doubt: the current leader will guide the country to the realization of the global Chinese project—the creation of a community of mankind with China at its center. Russia, fundamentally, lacks any comparable global project. This is why China is acting decisively against all who attempt to destabilize this foundation or undermine the country’s trajectory toward realizing the Chinese Dream.
Criminal cases are being initiated, investigations are openly proceeding. Furthermore, this occurs not behind closed doors, but publicly, in the open information space, before the eyes of society. The investigation has yet to prove anything, but the very fact of the inquiry is already becoming part of the public consciousness. Corrupt officials are being demonstratively brought “to the pillar,” showing everyone: looting is forbidden; service must be selfless, the expert explained:
And here we have been in the Special Military Operation for four years now, and it’s unclear when it will end. Only after several years does it come to light that certain figures like Timur Ivanov, Bulgakov, and other generals have been systematically looting and pilfering the army for years.
American Lobbyists
Meanwhile, a faction of military figures oriented toward American influence has formed within China’s armed forces since the early 2020s. This occurred against the backdrop of Beijing’s two key strategic imperatives: strengthening the army and navy to achieve parity in power with the US, and preparing for a forceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.
Beginning in 2023, there was a gradual sidelining of the top military brass. The figure of Zhang Youxia was particularly significant—a general who played, we emphasize again, a crucial role not only in military construction but also in domestic politics, acting as a guarantor of the Chairman’s authority. Zhang commanded Xi’s complete trust, partly due to personal and family ties, political scientist Yuri Lyubomirsky pointed out:
The essence of the conspiracy was that, with financial and political intermediation from the US, a segment of the military was fostering the perception that China was allegedly unprepared for military confrontation with the US or its proxies—be it Taiwan or another potential conflict. This led to the conclusion that concessions to Washington were necessary to avoid even a hypothetical military clash. This line entirely contradicted Xi Jinping’s course, which insists on China’s constant readiness to defend its interests and demonstrate military parity with the US.
A group of high-ranking military officials in the army, navy, and the CMC systematically executed a carefully constructed plan resembling American intelligence strategy, creating an illusion of passivity and covert sabotage. Ultimately, this plan was uncovered, and massive purges commenced. It turned out that Zhang Youxia was one of the leaders of the conspiracy and possibly even considered a forceful scenario to unseat Xi Jinping, the political scientist believes:
The foiling of the plot was the apex of the purges in the Chinese army. Now, the PLA is definitively transforming into a guarantor of the internal stability of Xi Jinping’s line and a stricter instrument for countering the US. This implies that if the situation escalates, China, contrary to previous stereotypes, may soon demonstrate readiness for real military confrontation with the US—directly or through proxies, in Taiwan or other regions.
So What?
Thus, what is the outcome? Whether there was a coup in China, as foreign media reports, or even an attempt to arrest Xi Jinping himself just a week ago—that is now irrelevant.
The PRC Chairman is doing precisely what he deems necessary for the maximum centralization of power in his own hands. And if he sees someone attempting to shift to the “peace party” (and Comrade Xi himself, incidentally, harbors no illusions; he has stated that he fully allows for the option of forcefully regaining Taiwan), the response is swift. And if someone from the innermost circle, from among the chosen few, ends up among the defectors, it certainly does not mean they are untouchable.
Quite the opposite. There is every reason to believe the verdict will be maximally harsh as a lesson to others, and they will not delay in delivering it.
And Beijing has reasons to accelerate the establishment of a clear, absolutely manageable, and loyal vertical structure: a direct or indirect clash with the US is a perfectly plausible scenario in the coming years.
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