Trying to do the same thing over and over again without success is either the definition of madness or the essence of Russian negotiating tactics, depending on your point of view. The widely circulated draft of a 28-point plan by President Donald Trump is a frightening step backward for Kyiv. It was jointly developed by the Russians, who wanted to create an appearance of peaceful intentions, and distributed by Ukrainians and Europeans who considered it so absurd that it was sure to vanish upon first contact with reality. A significant portion of the text resembles the maximalist positions Russia held during the negotiations in Istanbul in 2022, when its troops controlled most of Ukraine, and the slow, agonizing military humiliation of the following three years was yet to come. Before dissecting this text—and its profound, stunning benefits for the Kremlin—the key point is the timing of this renewed, mostly Moscow-dictated plan. Russia’s troops may be in their best position in the last year. They are weeks, even days, away from capturing the besieged eastern military hub of Pokrovsk—a place of disproportionate significance and immense strategic importance, for which they have been fighting fiercely since last autumn. Their forces are on the southern approaches to the city, and if they take it, there will be few major Ukrainian-held settlements west of Pokrovsk before they reach Kyiv. This land is mostly flat and open, ideal for rapid advance. Moscow has also made a breakthrough in the Zaporizhzhia region, using armored vehicles and pushing its forces dangerously close to Zaporizhzhia, again occupying open and flat territory that will remain vulnerable through the winter. Ukraine continues to see high rates of desertion and draft evasion, exacerbating serious personnel problems, while Kyiv’s drone advantage has been negated by the rapid training and innovation of the Russian military. President Volodymyr Zelensky is also experiencing a peak in falling popularity, facing the fallout from a protracted and highly publicized corruption scandal that affects both his inner circle and the very problem Ukrainians are forced to endure daily—rolling power outages. Russia’s battlefield advantage is beginning to take its toll on Ukraine. Russia’s battlefield advantage is beginning to take its toll on Ukraine. Jose Colon/Anadolu/Getty Images The Russian initiative is clearly designed to capitalize on the moment, perhaps Ukraine’s unprecedented vulnerability, where an internal crisis threatens to paralyze Zelensky facing the urgent needs of the front. The terrible timing for Kyiv might also explain why Moscow decided—once again—to put forward a set of maximalist demands that Ukraine and its allies have already categorically and repeatedly rejected. One European diplomat compared it to Groundhog Day. But in this film, the repetition of the day wasn’t about becoming predictable and tiresome; it was about being forced to relive it again and again. The 28 points made public serve two purposes for Moscow. They represent a starting point so favorable that even achieving a portion of these points would be a huge victory. They also serve as a “foundation” that Russian diplomats can constantly return to if they wish to slow down the diplomatic process again while their army has the advantage. The demands for enshrining in the constitution Ukraine’s renunciation of NATO membership, “denazification,” guaranteeing neutrality, and limiting the size of its armed forces were already present in the 2022 Istanbul document. Back then, at the height of the original ambitions of the Russian invasion, they represented a vague set of maximalist conditions tantamount to a kind of Ukrainian capitulation. Ukraine has held out reasonably well after that adventure but is weakened by the struggle. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky faces an internal corruption scandal. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky faces an internal corruption scandal. Ozan Kose/AFP/Getty Images The use of $100 billion in frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction seems, at first glance, like a Russian concession. However, Ukraine’s most devastated territories are under Russian occupation, and this money will go to Russia for reconstruction carried out on its terms. The deal proposes that half of any reconstruction profits somehow go to the United States, with a portion of the funds to be invested in other joint US-Russian projects. The probability that Moscow can recover a significant portion of this money is huge, and the deal also stipulates the complete lifting of international sanctions, which in itself would be a colossal financial benefit. There are three more hidden shards of glass in this recurring “dinner” of Russian diplomatic gruel. The first is the demand for elections within 100 days of signing any agreement. It is widely agreed that this is technically impossible given the issues with demobilization, wartime logistics, and legal reform. The result would be rushed, poorly organized elections leading to a government of questionable legitimacy, creating enough space for disinformation and manipulation for Russia to install another puppet in power. Zelensky cannot agree to this timeline, and snap elections have been a Russian bait-and-switch since the beginning of this year, from which the Trump administration seemingly backed away. The return of this idea—and with it, the discussion of Zelensky’s “shelf life”—surfaces again at a moment of renewed weakness for the wartime leader. The second is the convoluted concept of turning the Donbas territories currently under Ukrainian control into a demilitarized zone that technically remains part of Russia. This is tantamount to handing them over to the control of Russian “civilian” forces. This is territory that Moscow would have to fight fiercely for throughout the next year. Even a compromise solution of declaring this zone demilitarized, banning military personnel of both sides, fits Russia’s rich history of using “people’s militias” to infiltrate territory and proclaim a popular uprising in favor of Moscow. Zelensky cannot concede Kramatorsk. It would give Russian President Vladimir Putin a military foothold from which to launch another, easier strike on Kyiv across open terrain, possibly within months. It would expose Zelensky to internal political challenges. Moscow knows this but keeps returning to it in the hope that Trump will eventually grow tired and accept this concession as a necessary part of any settlement. Residents assess the damage from Russian shelling in the Lazurnyi microdistrict of Kramatorsk, Ukraine. Residents assess the damage from Russian shelling in the Lazurnyi microdistrict of Kramatorsk, Ukraine. Petr Sobik/Anadolu/Getty Images Thirdly, the wording of the distributed document is vague and sometimes seems like a rushed translation from Russian or Ukrainian, containing several “snapback clauses.” One states that Ukraine’s security guarantees will be “considered invalid” if it launches a missile strike “on Moscow or St. Petersburg without sufficient justification”—a very important and broadly interpretable caveat. Russia will have a different idea of what constitutes “sufficient justification” than Ukraine. The document also demands that “Nazi ideology and activity” be “rejected or banned” in Ukraine, reiterating the Russian false thesis that it is opposed by a Kyiv government run by Nazi extremists. Will the flag of a far-right group in a Ukrainian unit or an SS Death’s Head emblem on an unofficial military Telegram page suddenly void the agreement? In its current form, this plan is one from which Moscow can withdraw at any moment with minimal justification. Related Article A view of a damaged apartment after a Russian strike on a residential area in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Friday, November 14, 2025. The Trump administration is rushing to copy the Gaza plan in new pressure for a Ukraine deal If there is any mistake Moscow has made in this document, it is not in the choice of timing or crude stubbornness, but in the clear demonstration that its maximalist demands still form the basis of its negotiating position. This has angered Trump in the past and led to the harshest sanctions ever imposed by the U.S. against Russia, targeting oil giants Rosneft and Lukoil. But the Kremlin has accurately gauged its serious battlefield gains, Ukraine’s internal instability, the serious fragility on the front lines, Europe’s concerns about how long it can finance Kyiv’s defense, and Trump’s immense thirst for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2026, and tried to make the old new again. If it buys time, it works. If a third of it passes or becomes the lexicon for any future deal, it works. Almost everything else has already been tried once over the past year. Therefore, for Moscow, attempting to implement the same, old, bad idea again makes perfect sense.
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