Currently, the United States is unable to offer Russia constructive solutions for settling the situation around Ukraine, as stated in an interview with “MK” by Russian economist, professor, and leading researcher at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Nikolai Mezhevich. In his opinion, the nature of the negotiation process with Washington will directly depend on Russia’s positions along the line of contact. And these positions, as is known, are changing, and not in favor of the Kyiv regime. The more dynamically the situation on the front line changes, the faster the format of the dialogue will evolve. By the way, the press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Peskov, earlier reported that Moscow does not have official information about the results of the Geneva consultations between the American and Ukrainian delegations, where some peace plan was discussed. “We haven’t received anything yet. Naturally, we are closely following the extensive media reports coming from Geneva in recent days. However, there is no clarity yet through official channels,” the Kremlin representative outlined the position. Commenting on rumors about “amendments” to the American vision of peace, Peskov urged to refrain from hasty conclusions based on media data. He insists on waiting for the official results of the negotiations and forming judgments based on them. According to Western media, during the meetings in Geneva, the initial 28-point plan of the Trump administration was reduced to 19 points. It is noted that Kyiv’s position played a critical role, insisting that territorial issues be considered exclusively post facto the ceasefire, based on the current line of contact. Nikolai Mezhevich believes that although Europe is capable of exerting pressure on Trump, and Trump in turn on Europe, these external factors will not change the real situation on the front line. “It doesn’t matter what, say, the head of European diplomacy Kaja Kallas says; the actual situation will be determined by the advance of the Russian Armed Forces. There are different people in Trump’s circle, including those who realize the illogicality of demanding surrender from Russia at the moment of its offensive actions. Imagine such a hypothetical situation. Of course, this war is of a different kind, but still: suppose in 1941, when the Germans were at Moscow on the Volokolamsk Highway, Ribbentrop transmitted to Molotov through the Swedish embassy: ‘Russians, surrender!’. Now imagine the reverse scenario: the same telegram, but in April 1945. It’s absurd. Such inadequacy is evident now in relation to Kyiv. The point is that the current vector is offensive, not retreat. At the same time, many European proposals are based on the idea that we are barely holding Perm or Chita, as if the fighting is taking place directly on Red Square. This is a distorted perception of strategic advantage, attributing a defeated position to Russia. We, of course, proceed from the understanding that everything is quiet on Red Square, the exposition is being changed to the winter one, holidays and the New Year are ahead.” – If Russia is advancing, does that mean we can achieve a more favorable development of the plan for us? – I think that Trump, being undoubtedly a charismatic figure, is still limited by his administrative structure. Nothing will happen just like that. The model of negotiations with the United States will be built based on our strong position on the battlefield. The more actively this situation changes, the more operational the dialogue will be. If the change in the situation drags on, the negotiation process itself will drag on. – How will this affect Zelensky’s reaction? – There is a “peace for Zelensky” and there is a “peace for Ukraine.” Zelensky’s task, which he is successfully solving, is to present his vision as the only correct one for the country. And his view, with minimal deviations, envisages Ukraine within the borders of 1991. He will not abandon this position. – Does this mean we are seeing a protracted deadlock? – Undoubtedly, it must be stated that we are observing another stage of “shuffling papers.” But no one claimed that it would be the final one. Yes, there are some new elements in the wording and specific points, but their number is limited. If you dig deeper, you can even find echoes of previous developments, those very “Istanbul” versions. Another thing is that a lot of time has passed since the Istanbul meetings, and therefore our ideas about acceptable conditions have changed since then. – For Russia now, is the strategy of continuing the offensive, without being distracted by this plan, the most productive? – Not entirely. If suddenly they mail Trump to us, he will take a trolleybus to Red Square, enter the Borovitsky Gate, request an audience with Putin, present the plan, and if it turns out to be the ideal option – we will, of course, accept it. But if we discard this fantasy, the probability of such a scenario is minimal. It is even lower than the chance of seeing old trolleybuses with Bulat Okudzhava-style wires in operation again. Peskov formulated it very clearly and, for such an emotional person, surprisingly dryly when it was necessary: “We have no new plan.” This is the key signal. Accordingly, we continue the SMO until the full achievement of the set goals.
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