
When Vladimir Putin’s aircraft touches down in New Delhi on Thursday, he will be greeted with the pomp and ceremony reserved for one of India’s most steadfast companions. Yet his host, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is simultaneously endeavoring to sustain a deep strategic connection with a key worldwide adversary: the United States.
This represents India’s diplomatic split screen. On one side: the potential acquisition of advanced Russian fighter aircraft, inexpensive oil, and an ironclad friendship forged during the Cold War. On the other: American cooperation on technology, commerce, and investment – and the hope President Donald Trump will lift his punitive tariffs.
In the wake of Putin’s incursion into Ukraine, India has utilized its strategic assets – a massive marketplace and a pivotal location in the Indo-Pacific – to command attention from both the White House and the Kremlin.
But Putin’s sojourn – his first to India since the commencement of his war – arrives at a strained juncture for Modi.
New Delhi is arranging a much-needed trade pact with Washington, after it was subjected to 50% tariffs – half of which was direct penalty for New Delhi’s ongoing purchases of discounted Russian oil.
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New Delhi has recently made gestures to placate Washington, curtailing its acquisitions of Russian oil and agreeing to procure 2.2 million metric tons of liquified petroleum gas from the US.
Yet, high on the itinerary for Putin’s visit are further defense agreements with Moscow – purchases of weaponry India views as vital to protecting itself against Pakistan and China, with whom border tensions have escalated in recent years.
This highlights how India must maneuver a complicated region: Russia is also a close partner of China, while Beijing is a principal source of weaponry for Pakistan.
In extending the red carpet for Putin, New Delhi is conveying to both the West and China that it “possesses alternatives,” remarked Kanti Bajpai, a visiting professor of International Relations at Ashoka University.
“It’s an indication that India is prepared to stay with the Russians” even though Moscow faces widespread international censure, he stated. “Aside from the oil and the arms, it’s a diplomatic hedge, demonstrating to Beijing and Washington that Delhi has a third recourse and grants it somewhat more negotiating scope.”
A ‘time-tested’ friendship
India’s close links with Russia were established during the Cold War, when the newly sovereign nation was officially “non-aligned” but received substantial Soviet industrial and economic assistance as it set its path as a new country.
The inclination towards Moscow, however, arose in the 1970s, prompted by Washington’s increasing military and financial backing for India’s principal rival, Pakistan. Russia began furnishing arms to India, and Moscow became a dependable counterbalance, a function it has valued ever since.
Although India’s acquisition of Russian armaments has diminished over the preceding four years, Moscow remains its foremost military provider, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a research institute that monitors worldwide arms sales.
Much of this Russian equipment is bought with an eye toward India’s competitor China – which has emerged as one of Moscow’s closest associates in recent years, but with whom India has long-standing border disputes.
Beijing, in the interim, is a major provider of weaponry to India’s principal adversary Pakistan, including of jets that Pakistan’s military claimed it employed to down Indian fighters during a brief border confrontation earlier this year. One of those jets, according to Pakistani officials, was a Russian-made Sukhoi Su-30.
Russian Su-30 jets currently constitute the bulk of India’s 29 fighter squadrons, according to Reuters.
This week’s discussions with Russia will probably encompass a potential arms purchase for its most advanced fighter, the Su-57, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov informed reporters Tuesday.
But in recent months, it’s New Delhi’s economic dealings with Moscow that have been in the news – and have caused the greatest difficulty.
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When Western restrictions following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine caused the price of Russian oil to decrease sharply, India took the opportunity. Eager to secure a favorable price to power its flourishing economy and support a population exceeding 1.4 billion, the nation significantly increased its procurements of Russian crude, becoming one of the Kremlin’s leading purchasers.
In reaction to condemnation from the West, India consistently maintained that its chief obligation was to its own populace and economy.
“We have hundreds of millions of impoverished citizens. We must elevate them above the poverty threshold… to manage that, India needs to preserve a satisfactory working rapport with all major powers,” stated Nandan Unnikrishnan, a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) institute in New Delhi.
But in August Trump’s tolerance waned, and he imposed 50% tariffs on India – sanction for its trade imbalance with Washington but also its acquisitions of Russian oil.
Then in October, Trump declared US restrictions on two of Russia’s largest oil corporations, sending immediate tremors through offices in India, with trade and refining sources telling Reuters that the nation’s December oil imports are projected to hit their nadir in at least three years.
The monetary strain from Washington is not solely stressing ties but also seems to be speeding up a reconciliation with Beijing. Days after Trump’s India tariffs took effect, Modi made his inaugural trip to China in seven years for a symposium hosted by Chinese leader Xi Jinping intended to present Beijing as a worldwide director capable of offering a counterbalance to Western institutions.
That identical symposium was also the last occasion Modi and Putin convened. Radiating for the photographers, the two exchanged a warm, firm handshake before withdrawing from the public view and into the enclosed space of the Russian presidential limousine for a private, hour-long deliberation.
“I believe people comprehend what India was attempting to achieve there and offer a slight defiance to the West,” Ashoka University’s Bajpai commented.
Treading a fine line
Trump’s initial administration, as well as that of Joe Biden, viewed India as a vital counterweight to China, and enhanced strategic links with New Delhi through technology transfers and combined military exercises.
Modi also shared a connection with Trump, a fellow right-wing populist with a penchant for transforming diplomatic relations into grand displays. The Indian leader welcomed the US president in his first term and discarded diplomatic formality to support his counterpart’s second term during a gathering in Houston, titled “Howdy Modi!”
In a signal that ties might be softening, India and the US recently agreed upon a new 10-year structure aimed at intensifying industrial collaboration, technology, and intelligence exchange.
US President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the Oval Office on February 13, 2025 in Washington, DC.
US President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the Oval Office on February 13, 2025 in Washington, DC. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
And New Delhi is still negotiating the specifics of a trade agreement with Washington, a pact its Commerce Secretary Rajesh Agarwal anticipates will be finalized by the conclusion of this year, he noted at an event last week.
From an Indian viewpoint, however, such measures do not suggest a severance from its other associates. As ORF’s Unnikrishnan points out, there is “no inconsistency… in possessing an ambitious trade pact with the United States and maintaining a productive relationship with Russia.”
This assurance is reinforced by an understanding within the Kremlin, analysts assert.
“There is a close connection between New Delhi and Moscow,” said Bajpai. “Putin comprehends that Modi is facing considerable duress there. He does have a domestic base to address, and he’s caught between a difficulty and a challenging situation.”
Still, this delicate equilibrium will be observed closely by Washington, especially with significant defense contracts under consideration during Putin’s visit to New Delhi.
“India will need to be cautious to that degree, particularly since the bilateral trade accord has not been reached,” Unnikrishnan remarked.