When the Trump administration unveiled its new national security strategy (NSS) last week, many experts noticed one major difference: how it speaks – or more significantly, refrains from speaking – about China.
Absent are the broad assertions about China being “America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge,” as articulated by the Biden administration. Nor does it contain much of the firmer phrasing in President Donald Trump’s first term NSS, which in 2017 described China as challenging “American power, influence and interests.”
Instead, this recent document, which every president submits to Congress outlining their foreign policy outlook, emphasized the US-China economic rivalry above all else – scarcely mentioning the worries about authoritarianism or human rights abuses that had consistently featured in prior administrations’ reports.
“There isn’t a single mention of great power competition with China. China is seen much more as an economic competitor,” remarked David Sacks, a senior colleague for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Wen Ti-Sung, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council think tank’s Global China Hub, characterized the document as a “rebalancing between interests and values.”
Rather than the US portraying itself as the “shining city upon a hill” – the President Ronald Reagan model of a nation acting as a beacon of liberty for the world – Trump’s new NSS is “about America first, it’s about focusing on developing America itself, and talking about commerce, almost first and foremost,” Wen added.
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Another indicator of how Trump views China on his list of security priorities lies in simply how little it’s mentioned overall – only for the initial time on page 19 of a 33-page paper, and taking up just one segment in a report that also covers Europe, Africa, the Middle East and other areas. By way of comparison, the Biden NSS from 2022 discusses China repeatedly across its 48 pages.
This alteration in tone and concentrated economic emphasis appears to have been well received in Beijing. When questioned about the NSS at a news briefing on Monday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Guo Jiakun stressed the merits of “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.”
“China is willing to work with the US to promote the continued stable development of China-US relations, while firmly safeguarding its own sovereignty, security, and development interests,” he stated.
While Guo reiterated China’s stance on sensitive matters such as Taiwan – a self-ruled island democracy that Beijing claims as its own territory – his statement was otherwise cautiously impartial, lacking the harsh criticism that frequently characterizes Chinese reactions to US policy.
“I read that as fairly positive,” Sacks commented, noting the circumstance that Trump intends to visit Beijing next spring in a much-anticipated summit.
“I think that the Chinese are also saying that the door is open to economic cooperation, and they want to work towards the April meeting between the two leaders.”
But some in China viewed Trump’s NSS with a more skeptical perspective – cautioning that the shift in wording does not necessarily signify a retreat.
State-run tabloid Global Times mentioned an expert who cautioned that the US’ new approach “repeatedly emphasizes the need to eliminate any external competitors or threats to US interests,” mirroring the ongoing rivalry between both nations.
Meng Weizhan, a researcher at the Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, offered a comparable warning. “The change in wording does not mean that the US no longer views China as a competitor,” he wrote in an article, adding that Trump might be altering tactics to “seek a more advantageous position.”
“Going forward, we will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence,” it states.
It’s notably distinct from Trump’s 2017 NSS, which “described China as a revisionist power,” Sacks observed. “This one has nothing to say about China’s strategic ambitions … and whether those are compatible with US interests.”
Particularly evident is the absence of any ideological contrast or mention of human rights issues, which were present in the previous two NSS documents.
The Biden administration had spotlighted Beijing’s role in committing alleged genocide in Xinjiang, rights violations in Tibet, and the erosion of freedoms and autonomy in Hong Kong. In 2017, Trump’s first-term document had chastised China for its authoritarianism, widespread monitoring, and push to establish a new world order alongside Russia.
“That’s completely absent from this document,” Sacks noted, adding that Beijing is “probably pretty pleased … because (the NSS) doesn’t set up an existential competition with (China).”
There may be several explanations for this modification. Trump’s administration could be attempting to proceed carefully ahead of the president’s April meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, hoping not to endanger any pacts or discussions, Sacks suggested.
It could also reflect a change in Trump’s cabinet, which in his initial term included more “traditional Republican national security thinkers” than in his present term, Sacks mentioned. Or perhaps the recent trade conflict was unexpectedly sobering for America – altering how the White House sees Beijing.
“I think there were many who believed that the United States had escalation dominance,” Sacks observed. But “we’ve seen in recent months that there is going to be a level of US-China interdependence … and both nations can inflict significant harm upon each other in the economic sphere.”
A new focus: Taiwan
This new NSS also concentrates less on delicate geopolitical pressure points, experts noted. For example, the Biden NSS had referenced several existing regional disputes including the military takeover in Myanmar and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In contrast, this edition fails to mention North Korea even once.
The sole geopolitical concern it addresses is Taiwan – a sensitive matter on which Washington has long maintained a delicate balance.
China’s governing Communist Party has vowed to assume control of the island eventually, by force if needed, and regards the issue as one of its firmest boundaries.
Washington sustains close unofficial relations with Taiwan, and is obligated by law to provide arms to the island for its self-defense – despite acknowledging the People’s Republic as the only legitimate government of China, and recognizing Beijing’s assertion that Taiwan is part of China.
However, while the US has never accepted the CCP’s claim of dominion over the island, Washington has generally remained vague about whether it would intervene in the event of a Chinese assault, a policy known as “strategic ambiguity.”
“There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters,” the new NSS states.
“Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the US economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority,” it reads, adding that the US and its allies must increase defense spending to avoid “a potentially hostile power to impose a toll system over one of the world’s most vital lanes of commerce.”
It conveys a strong message of deterrence to Beijing, which might be welcome news for Taiwan, said Sacks. But the document also moderated its wording elsewhere – asserting the US “does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” rather than the former wording of “opposing” any such alteration.
That could be appreciated by Beijing – rendering the Taiwan segment of the NSS a puzzling mix of signals, Sacks concluded.
The Chinese foreign ministry’s reply on Monday was similarly subdued, with spokesperson Guo advising the US to “handle the Taiwan issue with utmost caution.”
Individuals in Taiwan are likely in a “wait and see” stance, perhaps feeling uncertain or doubtful where they stand under the new NSS, remarked Wen, the Atlantic Council colleague.
“I think Taiwan is looking towards Washington to ascertain whether this demonstration of goodwill and responsibility will finally result in more consolidation and increased predictability in a firm US support stance for Taiwan going forward,” he further added.
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